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THE LONGUE DUREE OF SPENGLER’S THESIS OF 
THE DECLINE OF THE WEST  
 
Abstract 
Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West was a 
major publishing success Weimar Germany. The 
study presents the end of Western civilization as 
an inevitable process of birth, maturity and 
death. 
Civilization is conceived as an inflexible  
‘morphology’. Spengler’s thinking was influenced 
by a profound distaste with the optimism of the 
Belle Epoque. He saw this optimism as sheer 
complacency. The argument had a good deal of 
attraction to readers, especially German readers, 
who were lashed to what Keynes called, the 
‘Carthaginian Peace’, of the Versailles Treaty 
(1919). Adorno, and other critics, rejected the 
thesis for its ‘monstrous’, ‘mechanical’, 
reductive view of social development. It seemed 
to give no place for human insight or self 
determination. Interestingly, despite Adorno’s 
rejection, he returned to the thesis on a number 
of occasions in later life.  For Adorno, certain 
aspects of Spengler’s insights into the failing 
nature of Western kultur retained traction. This 
paper reassesses the value of Spengler’s thesis 
as a contribution to contemporary social theory. 
It does so at an historical juncture in which the 
‘New Caesarism’ that Spengler predicted must, 
inevitably emerge from the failure of 
Plebiscitary Parliamentary Democracy to 
perpetually deliver what it perpetually promises.  
What does Spengler have to teach us about Trump, 
Putin, May, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders or 
Nikolaos Michaloilakos today?  Weighed in the 
balance, what does The Decline of the West mean 
today?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who now reads Spengler? Adorno’s (1966a, 1967a) 
demolition of Spengler’s thesis in The Decline of 
the West is widely regarded to have settled 
accounts (Spengler 1926, 1928, 1991). Adorno 
repudiates Spengler’s cyclical model of history 
as the rise and fall of civilizations on the 
grounds that it is absolutist and reductive. It 
rests upon ‘a tyranny of categories’ and numerous 
factual inaccuracies. He condemns it as finally, 
an ‘astrological’ account of the development of 
civilizations (Adorno 1966a; 1967a: 61). In spite 
of this, as we shall see presently, Adorno 
retained a grudging respect for many of 
Spengler’s observations and insights pertaining 
to culture, especially those having to do with 
the aridity of contemporary Western philosophy, 
metropolitan segregation, wealth inequalities, 
the exhaustion of high culture and the crisis in 
Parliamentary Democracy. This is one reason why 
he returns repeatedly, to The Decline of the 
West, despite hanging the thesis out to dry. 
Another reason, why he cannot quite rid himself 
of it, is the spell that Spengler’s study cast 
over young Germans of Adorno’s (post-Versailles 
Treaty) generation (1). In its day, The Decline 
of the West, which appeared in two volumes, was a 
publishing sensation (Spengler 1926, 1928; 
abridged edition, 1991). In a contemporary review 
of the second volume published in The Annals of 
the American Academy, Howard P. Becker described 
the book as a ‘success fou’ (a fantastic 
success), especially in Germany, where the first 
volume achieved sales of over 100,000 (Becker 
1929: 458;  Almen 1996: 4). Spengler commenced 
preparing the manuscript before the Great War, 
and completed the first volume in 1917. The 
conflict left a mark upon the pessimistic course 
taken by his thesis.  Consecutively, it shaped 
the public response to it, which was laudatory 
and fulsome. The first volume was published in 
the summer of 1918. A few months thereafter, the 
Armistice brought an end to hostilities. The 
calamity of World War 1 tarnished Western 
Europe’s concept of Western civilization as the 
summit of world history. Estimates put total 
battle fatalities at 9.4 million; one out of 
every eight men who served, never returned home 
(Winter 2010: 249, 251). Some combat sites became 
infamous in European History: Ypres, Arras, 
Gallipoli, Passchendaele, Lys, the Somme, the 
Marne; 700,000 died at the battle of Verdun alone 
(Schurner 2008: 643). It was not just a matter of 
the unprecedented  numbers of battle-dead and 
injured. The First World War produced a degree of 
cultural dislocation and psychological trauma 
that seemed to render conventional techniques of 
mourning and healing obsolete. In aggregate, it 
is estimated that half the men who perished in 
battle were never found, or were unidentifiable 
(Jay 2014: 36). This then, was a war of erasure 
like no other in scale or technological 
sophistication. Not surprisingly, incredulity and 
incomprehension at what was widely experienced as 
the collapse of civilization, were among the most 
common public responses to the catastrophe. 
Readers of Spengler’s magnum opus were gripped by 
a desperate craving to be supplied with answers 
to their state of frantic confusion about the 
ruins of the Western ideal of progress. Such was 
the backdrop to the publication of Spengler’s 
first volume. 
 
La Belle Epoque 
 
Before examining his thesis, it is necessary to 
go a little further into the historical context 
in which the study saw the light of day. Today, 
it is easy to under-estimate the degree to which 
the Great War, eventually, shattered the West’s 
civilized image of itself. La Belle Epoque (1871-
1914), is the generic term given to the long 
period of calm, growth, and prosperity in Europe 
that preceded the War. The novelist, Henry James, 
referred to La Belle Epoque as, ‘the high 
refinement of civilization’ (Strachan 2014: 429). 
In every area of modern life, the West seemed 
unapologetically, paramount. In economic 
relations, the world’s financial and trade 
operations, revolved around a shipping, insurance 
and banking network in which the City of London 
was a colossus. In science, medicine and 
technology, human systems of communication, 
transport, housing and public health appeared to 
be revolutionized.  Experiments and movements in 
painting, dance, music and literature reinforced 
Europe’s dominance, by portraying the continent’s 
high culture, as the pinnacle of global 
achievement and aspiration (Macmillan 2013; 
Emmerson 2013). In short, for men like James, 
Europe had unquestionably, established itself as 
the foremost economic, military and cultural 
power bloc on earth. After all was said and done, 
the West had good reason to regard itself as the 
greatest civilization in world history. 
To be sure, there were a few dissenting voices. 
For example, Max Nordau, writing at the peak of 
La Belle Epoque, gathered intimations of total 
degeneration all around him (Nordau 1895). In his 
view, the so-called liberating, enriching 
achievements of the period obscured ‘ego-mania’, 
Max Nordau ‘decadence’, ‘mysticism’ and 
‘diabolism’, no less.  These constituted the real 
essence and direction of the times, albeit buried 
beneath the pomp, ceremony and arrogant 
equanimity that formed the veneer of  
civilization. Instead of the triumph of the West, 
Nordau portrayed a civilization enmeshed in toxic 
and hopeless decay. It was a note to which 
Spengler was to adopt and elaborate later.  
          Likewise, Simmel (1991, original 1907), 
working in a very different tradition of 
‘sociological impressionism’, wrote of ‘the 
leveling effect’ of money on human relations 
(Frisby 1992). In advanced Western capitalism, 
money becomes the sole axis of interest. Simmel 
distinguishes two defining social tendencies, 
both of which he diagnoses as corrosive for 
culture and society. The spread of cynicism, 
which sees only the price of everything and the 
value of nothing; and the onset of, what he 
calls, the blasé attitude, which never raises its 
anchor from the shallow psycho-social bay of 
indifference, and colours all things with ‘an 
equally dull and grey hue’ (Simmel 1991: 256). 
The higher values of truth, nobility and virtue, 
which would have been readily understood by 
civilized men and women in the centuries 
stretching from Socrates, Aquinas, to Erasmus and 
Rousseau, bid their adieu. All that remains is 
the tawdry, ultimately meaningless, sport of the 
stock exchange, which operates as the avatar of 
everything in culture and life. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Spengler regarded the fully 
developed money economy of the West in much the 
same terms (Spengler 1991: 365-70). In the 
glorification and blind worship of money, he 
found further, incontrovertible evidence that 
Western civilization is waning.  
There are passages of beautifully written, 
penetrating, critical insight in The Decline of 
the West, which makes one appreciate why Adorno 
continued to return to it, despite condemning the 
logic of the thesis as the hocus pocus of a 
conservative reactionary. For example, on the 
relationship between money and democracy, 
Spengler writes, ‘the concepts of Liberalism and 
Socialism are set in effective motion only by 
money … with the franchise comes electioneering, 
in which he who pays the piper calls the tune’ 
(Spengler 1991: 367).  Largely, Spengler wrote at 
a rarefied level. However, this sort of realism 
about he who pays the tune, endeared him to young 
German readers pole-axed by the stark severity of 
Versailles (Weitz 2007: 335). The question of 
Spengler’s seductive literary style is important 
in explaining the endurance of his work. It will 
be taken up in more detail later. 
Yet when all is said and done, the work of Nordau 
or Simmel, barely ruffled the composure and self-
regard. Doubtless, Simmel would have regarded 
this haughty indifference as proof of how deeply 
entrenched the blasé attitude had grown in the 
West. The cosmopolitan cafes, government offices 
and University lecture halls of the great 
metropolitan centres of the West -  mega-cities, 
which Spengler (1991) regarded as butcheries of 
savagery - remained largely indifferent. What 
could possibly disturb the equanimity of the 
greatest civilization known to mankind?   
With hindsight, this serene outlook was akin to 
nothing so like pride before a fall. To begin 
with, when the threat came to peace, it was 
hardly even acknowledged in popular relations 
(Emmerson 2013; Macmillan 2013). Initially, the 
assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Franz 
Ferdinand, and his wife Sophie, in June 1914, in 
a nondescript Balkan town, that seldom figured on 
anyone’s itinerary or idea of the ‘Grand European 
Tour’, (Sarajevo), was absorbed as a containable 
tragedy. For a while, life in the cosmopolitan 
cities went on as before (Strachan 2014). The 
spectre of an impending rupture to the entire 
framework of world order was confined to the 
Foreign Office’s and International Trade 
Department’s of European capitals.  
To begin with, the outbreak of hostilities was 
welcomed on both sides. An air of euphoria, 
buoyed by jingoism, ruled more or less unopposed 
over the public (Kershaw 2015). It was assumed 
that hostilities would end quickly, and that 
stability would follow in short order. Many 
commentators encountered this frenzy of festive 
nationalism as naive and distasteful. Freud, who 
rarely ventured into the fray on social or 
political matters, despaired of the ‘obduracy’, 
‘inaccessibility to the most forcible arguments’, 
‘uncritical credulity’ and ‘logical bedazzlement’ 
of the war-mongers and their cheer-leaders (Freud 
1915: 287). He was soon proved right. The war, 
that was meant to be over in a few weeks, or, at 
worst, a few  months, dragged on for four 
grinding years. All generations felt the lash, 
but the cut ran deepest among the young. During 
hostilities Emile Durkheim, lost many of his most 
talented students. Maxime David, Antoine 
Bianconi, Charles Peguy, Jean Rainier and Robert 
Hertz, all perished at the front. For Durkheim, 
during the war years, the pace of time in his own 
life slackened. He complained of the war years 
‘passing slowly’, as well as feeling ‘remote’, 
and always ‘living in fear’.  More bad news 
seemed to be forever just around the corner 
(Fournier 2013:692-701). When he learned the sad 
news that his son, Andre had succumbed from his 
battle wounds, he wrote, in a letter to his 
nephew, Marcel Maus, ‘I feel detached from all 
worldly interests. I don’t know if I ever laughed 
much, but I’m through with laughing … due to no 
longer having any temporal interest’ (Besnard and 
Fournier 1998: 508). For such a tireless student 
of society, who, by nature, was insatiably 
curious about questions of social integration, 
moral density, normality, abnormality and social 
change, to confess to loosing ‘temporal interest’ 
is surely  desolate. It was as if the war had 
opened a black hole extinguishing all of his 
energies and sense of purpose. Durkheim died on 
15th November 1917, nearly a full year before the 
Armistice brought hostilities to cessation. One 
cannot rid oneself of the feeling that he died of 
a broken heart. Nor is it remotely convincing to 
see him as being alone in this respect. It was 
not just his son, his most promising students and 
the children of others, who had succumbed. The 
rational hopes of the Enlightenment, and the 
positive sociology of La Belle Epoque, lay in 
shreds.  
 
The Spengler Thesis 
 
There is absolutely no doubt that the backdrop of 
Spengler’s thesis was dreadful night. But what 
does the book actually profess?  One suspects 
that, today, and perhaps even in its own day, The 
Decline of the West, belongs to the class of 
books better known for their title than their 
contents. It is surely this that breaks the spell 
of absent-mindedness that usually surrounds 
Spengler, except when Western interests seem 
imperilled, is judged to be taking a turn for the 
worse. Thus, when America entered the second 
world war, anxieties about ‘the decline of the 
West’ began to bubble up and bring to the surface 
Spengler’s half-forgotten prophecies (Weight 
1942). Similarly, public anxieties about the Cold 
War in the 1950s and 60s, precipitated the fear 
that Western civilization was staring in the face 
of its own dissolution (Braun 1957). More 
recently, Spengler’s title has been deployed as a 
catch-phrase to apply to the legitimation crisis 
in the European Union, and the reputed sunset of 
American leadership in world affairs (McNaughton 
2012; Merry 2013). It must be granted that this 
is a strange state of affairs. Long after the 
essentials have been conclusively falsified, 
Spengler’s study seems, after all, to persist in 
the longue duree (Braudel and Matthews 1992; 
Braudel 1994) (2). Perhaps it is appropriate to 
speak of a double life to the thesis. Usually, in 
normal times, it is assumed to be dead and 
buried. But in times of disturbance and 
diplomatic hyper-tension it rises from the dead 
and superficially, seems to present insights that 
are rediscovered as if they are fresh and uncanny 
in their relevance. It is the nosferatu among 
modern theories of Western social development. It 
sucks the blood out of international crises, 
emergencies and economic slumps, to renew itself 
as a classic of begrudged profundity. Whereof 
this vampiric power?  
The question commands us to consider what the 
study actually professes. To begin with, one must 
pay tribute to the dramatic, technical  
organization of the argument. Most academic 
studies end with a conclusion. Spengler commences 
with one.  For him, The West is in irreversible, 
fatal decline. This starling beginning is not 
offered as speculation or hypothesis. It is set 
forth more in the nature of an absolute, 
incontrovertible fact. The remainder of the book 
amounts to an exhaustive attempt to deliver a 
pretext that corroborates the conclusion. It 
draws from a vast array of resources in history, 
aesthetics, art, religion, philosophy, economics, 
mathematics, literature, geography and 
technology. Spengler was a heroic, tireless 
autodidact. His curiosity about humanity observed 
few boundaries. The legacy of this was an 
eventful, at times, scatter-brain, magpie quality 
to his exegesis. Facts, observations and asides 
pile-up, often without a discernible shape to 
explain their relevance to the general argument. 
This, together with a mostly, lapidary style of 
expression that seems to relish the virtue of not 
wearing its learning lightly, imposes steep 
challenges upon the reader. It is impossible to 
put the two volumes down without coming away with 
a sense of having been bludgeoned by the dense 
quality of the argument. For all of that, in 
spite of the many detours and cul de sacs, the 
thing that Spengler keeps coming back to is the 
stubborn, invincible prelude: the West is coming 
to an inevitable end.  
It might be surmised that the Great War provided 
all the proof that Spengler ever needed to verify 
his thesis. However, this would be to ignore the 
extraordinary historical range of his work. Long 
before Braudel and the Annales School of 
historiography, Spengler’s historical method 
articulates the importance of what became known 
as the longue duree in social analysis. 
Methodologically speaking, (1928, 1929, 1991) the 
chief contribution of his study in support of 
this is the insistence that civilization 
possesses a morphology (Farrenkopf 2000). In the 
history of ideas, this breaks sharply with the 
18
th
 century tradition of German historiography, 
championed by Herder and others, that the nation-
state is the primary unit of historical analysis. 
For Spengler, the primary unit is civilization.  
            Posthumously, this way of proceeding 
commended his work as an early contribution to 
multi-culturalism. Contra critics like Lewis 
Mumford,  Spengler never made a creed of national 
superiority (Mumford 1944).  Instead, his study 
is a cyclical theory of world history in which 
nations are subordinate to the logic of the rise 
and fall of civilizations (Kidd 2012: 21-22; 
Farrenkopf 1993: 395). As we shall see presently, 
it enables him to posit that the inescapable 
contradictions the eventually emerge between high 
kultur and zivilization, are the secret behind 
the end of all civilizations. The recognition of 
plural civilizations here, is significant for 
multi-culturalist’s. The concept of the 
morphology of civilization acknowledged that the 
civilizations that preceded the West possessed 
distinctive value. The West may excel in science, 
technology, medicine and militarism, but Spengler 
is unflappable in his conviction that preceding 
civilizations excelled in ways of their own. All 
notions of the total historical superiority of 
the West must be taken with a pinch of salt.  
             Another reason why Spengler is often 
regarded as a forerunner of multi-culturalism is 
his insistence that Western civilization is, in 
no sense supremely,immutable. At a time when it 
was not common, or fashionable, to do so, 
Spengler taught that other civilization’s had to 
be studied and understood as finite entities. 
Each civilization has its own morphology which 
goes a long way in explaining what made it 
dominant and notable in its own time. But no 
civilization is permanent in dominance.  The West 
does not escape this law. Spengler’s impatience 
with the notion that the West is a civilization 
of endless duration, carries over into hostility 
with the idea that it is truly standardizing and 
universal.  Morphology then, is the crux of 
Spengler’s thesis. But what does the concept 
really mean? 
 
Spengler and the Morphology of Civilization 
 Of course, the morphology of civilization can be 
apprehended by human consciousness. How else 
could Spengler (or anyone else) possibly write 
about it?  However, Spengler’s exposition also 
made it abundantly clear that morphology is 
totally separate from all powers of human 
interference. It is reasonable to expect to 
understand it, but not to control it. Spengler is 
not so much making a methodological point here, 
as settling theoretical scores.  Marx’s 
historical materialism was famously based in the 
precept, beautifully articulated in The 
Eighteenth Brumarie of Louis Bonaparte, that ‘men 
make their own history, but they do not make it 
as they please; they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past’ (Marx 1968: 96). Spengler’s concept of 
morphology was deeply unsympathetic to this way 
of looking at things. It regarded the history 
that men make, and the conditions transmitted 
from the past, to be incidental and secondary to 
the morphology. For Spengler, morphology is the 
matrix through which all human behaviour is 
played out. It is conceived as an organic 
structure that is impervious to human design and 
interference. The essence of all organic 
structures, is to be subject to a cycle of birth, 
maturity, decay and extinction. In Spengler’s 
perspective, the most accurate metaphor to 
explain morphology is the shape of the soul. To 
his way of thinking, the economic, philosophical, 
political, religious, legal, technological and 
cultural constituents of culture are merely 
concrete expressions of this soul (Adorno 1967a: 
69). For Spengler, humanity is not primarily 
subject to anthropological, sociological or 
‘zoological’ constructs. ‘The people,’ he 
declares, ‘is a unit of the soul” (Spengler 1991: 
264-265). Needless to say, the substance of what 
he really means in proposing that civilization 
has a soul is frustratingly elusive. It is an 
admonition truly receptive only to metaphysical  
criteria. The metaphysical core in Spengler’s 
work exposes his self vaunted cold ‘realism’ to 
be a husk. The implication that human life can be 
conceptualized in strictly standardized terms, as 
if it is essentially unitary, is a strain on 
credulity in our own multi-cultural, contingent, 
pluralist, liquid times (3). His preference for 
approaching and elucidating this question is to 
adopt what has been called an ‘intuitive 
history’, or to use Spengler’s term, a 
‘physiognomic’ approach, that relies on 
‘sympathy’, ‘compassion’ and ‘inward certainty’ 
Hundert (1967: 105). Most methodologist’s in the 
Social Sciences would find this deeply 
unsatisfactory. Intuitive history seems to be 
about adopting a point of view to the past that 
enables one to ‘feel’ the shape of human history 
and the direction of human development. In this 
respect, Spengler’s metaphor that there is a soul 
to morphology suits his purpose very well. It is 
in the nature of the soul to be impervious to 
conscious attempts to disclose its dimensions, or 
to test its functions.  Yet if one believes in 
the proposition that civilization has a soul, 
there is a natural disposition to see its 
influence everywhere.  
In the end, it is perhaps most valid to regard 
Spengler’s physiognomic method to be a form of 
vitalism. That is, the philosophical doctrine 
that maintains that all things are driven by an 
internal force that makes things happen in the 
world, but which eludes the categories of 
positive science.  Certainly, vitalism was hugely 
fashionable in Spengler’s day. For example, Henri 
Bergson’s notion of the élan vital (life drive), 
implies an evolutionary direction, and an inner 
connectedness, to all that is in the world, which 
sits comfortably with Spengler’s signature 
concepts of morphology, physiognomy and the cycle 
of civilizational birth, maturity and decay 
(Bergson 2001; 2003). Vitalism is, of course, 
antithetical to science. It regards the latter as 
fragmenting the world and reifying motion for 
essentially managerial purposes. Precisely this 
explains part of the appeal of Spengler’s study 
in the Weimar years. For did not the authority of 
Western civilization in La Belle Epoque finally, 
rest upon Rationality?  This was the main 
principle that the Enlightenment sought to 
advance:  Rationality offers the basis for 
evidence-based government, the adjudication of  
Disputes and the impartial deliverance of 
progress.  But was it not the purest expression 
of Rationality, namely, scientific knowledge and 
method, that was used to such terrible effect in 
the carnage of the Great War? In Weimar Germany, 
the popular sentiment was that something 
elemental, besides science, was required to 
explain the blind necessity of the Great War 
(Herf 1986: 53). It has been proposed that 
Spengler’s thesis is ultimately an expression of 
‘mysticism’ (Fischer 1989). But the catastrophic 
implosion of La Belle Epoque, caused by the Great 
War, was itself popularly regarded as a mystery 
that could not be explained by conventional, 
scientific means. It could only be contemplated 
by the tools of analogy and symbolism. Not to 
beat about the bush, Spengler’s method was 
perfectly pitched to appeal to those who had 
suffered the baffling devastation of the War.  
            The Decline of the West pays ample 
tribute to the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche as an 
influence.  But the concept of the morphology of 
civilization is surely more indebted to the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer (1818). In particular, 
comparison with Schopenhauer’s concept of ‘the 
world as will’ abounds with illuminating 
parallels. For Schopenhauer, all attempts to 
picture the world in terms of a priori deities or 
physical forces are groundless. Equally, it is 
futile to expect Reason to subdue the natural and 
social world to the commands or whims of men. The 
world is will. It has no intention, and obeys no 
master. It is simply a blind, impersonal, 
impassive, omnipotent force, upon which all 
things depend, and to which all things are 
subordinate. In respect of underlining the 
insignificance of human design and intentions, 
Spengler’s meaning of morphology has many of the 
same qualities. However, whereas Schopenhauer 
regarded the world as will to be fundamentally 
aimless, Spengler submitted that the morphology 
of civilization is subject to an innate, 
verifiable cycle of birth, maturity and death. To 
this, only the physiognomic approach can hope to 
gain access. Both thinkers teach that human 
affairs are dominated by an ineffable force that 
is absolute, profound and inexorable.   
Reading between the lines, Spengler’s thesis is 
an extended lament for what he sees as stricken 
German high culture, especially what he sees as 
the disastrous fall from the ideals of Goethe. 
This sense of living after the deluge, is very 
prominent in Spengler’s study. In this respect, 
there is more than a grain of truth in Mumford’s 
(1944: 374) comment that, for all of its 
unquestionable historical breadth, Spengler’s 
thesis succeeds only in exposing the limitations 
of Weimar Germany, and his own generation. 
Herein, the relationship between Spengler’s 
writings and German National Socialism continues 
to be a subject of deep controversy (Mumford 
1944: 373-376; Kidd 2012: 21-22). One of the most 
infamous propositions of The Decline of the West 
is that parliamentary democracy cannot, in the 
long run, deliver stable government. He shared 
this conviction with the Nazi jurist and legal 
theorist, Carl Schmitt (1988) (4). Both regarded 
Weimar constitutionalism as wholly incompatible 
with the real nature of human beings, rooted in 
race and tradition (Gusenjnova 2006: 11). Long 
before the emergence of Hitler or Mussolini, 
Spengler predicted that the crisis in Weimar 
parliamentary democracy would produce the ‘new 
Caeserism’ i.e. an era in which ‘strong leaders’ 
would seize power and peddle the illusion that 
civilization can be turned around from decline to 
rebirth. Mumford accuses Spengler’s discussion of 
‘new Caesarism’ as producing ‘an epic 
justification of the fascist attack’ on humanity 
(Mumford 1944:375). This is a misinterpretation 
of what Spengler actually meant. For Spengler, 
the ‘new Caesarism’ was not a renaissance, but a 
symptom of the final stages of civilizational 
decline. We know that the young Josef Goebbels 
and Adolf Hitler were avid readers of The Decline 
of the West (Sherratt 2013:18-19, 59-60; 
Longerich 2016: 21, 23, 24). However, it is, I 
think, far-fetched to see Spengler as the 
philosophical father of the Nazi movement. 
Spengler did not have a high opinion of Hitler. 
‘A dreamer,’ was his damning verdict, ’a 
numbskull … a man without ideas … in a word 
“stupid” (Kershaw 1998: 396). It is hardly 
Spengler’s fault that Hitler and Mussolini 
cherry-picked the most purple passages in the 
study and threw them into the mill of National 
Socialism. For example, they interpreted 
Spengler’s description of German kultur as ‘an 
enduring and inward union of eternal land and 
eternal blood’ as a summons to revitalize Aryan 
culture, after the humiliation of defeat in the 
War (Spengler 1928: 792, emphasis in original).  
However, any careful reading of Spengler’s text 
will reveal that the decline of civilization 
cannot be avoided by human design or 
intervention. His references to ‘eternal’ bonds 
were poetic motifs, intended to highlight and 
grieve for the futility of hoping to halt the 
decline of civilization. They were, so to speak, 
echoes from a world already lost. For Spengler, 
decline means decline. It is sheer wishful 
thinking to proffer that the descent of 
civilization is reversible.   
Spengler identified eight civilizations in human 
history: Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, 
Apollonian (Graeco-Roman), Mexican, Magian 
(Arabian), Faustian (Western). Each is holistic, 
with its own Kultursee and its own morphology. 
Once one knows how, and where, to look, the study 
of all eight civilizations reveals the same 
cyclical pattern of birth, maturity and death 
(Braun 1957: 527). Civilizations are born, 
develop and die in a bi-phasic pattern. First, 
high Kultur creates an organic, energetic sense 
of motion and direction; then, as high Kultur 
ages and atrophies, civilization (Zivilization) 
starts to become culturally sterile, and 
decomposition sets in (Farrenkopf 2000: 25). In 
this regard Spengler is a consistent student of 
Darwin. The phase of Kultur borrows omnivorously 
from preceding cultural traditions, but it fuses 
all that it absorbs into its own tissue. Thus, 
Faustian kultur absorbs the lessons of medicine, 
architecture, technology, and much else besides, 
from earlier civilizations, particularly Chinese, 
Apollonian and Magian precedents. But it reframes 
these lessons with its own imprimatur. The 
duration of Kultur ideally spans a thousand 
years, while the decomposition of zivilization 
may be measured out in hundreds of years (5).  
         If one confines oneself to the Faustian 
case, culture can be pictured in terms of four 
stages or ‘seasons’ (Frye 1974:2). The West had 
its ‘spring’ in medieval times, with the 
emergence of a warrior aristocracy, a clergy, a 
peasantry bound to the land, limited urban 
development, an anonymous art that served 
primarily, religious and military interests, and 
intense spiritual and poetic aspiration. The 
Renaissance was its ‘summer’ with the development 
of city states, court society, the rise of the 
merchant class, and a more personal form of art 
in which individuals, from all ranks of life, 
became important in the narrative. The ‘autumn’ 
begins in the eighteenth century when kultur 
started to exhaust its inner possibilities, loose 
its ‘inner certainties’, develop cities which 
divide urban man from the land, worship Reason as 
the controlling agent to rule over Nature and 
Society, and make the money economy ubiquitous 
and omnipresent. Its ‘winter’ begins in the late 
nineteenth century, in which the phase of culture 
gives way to the phase of civilization. In this 
era, art and philosophy become further exhausted 
and merely ape what has already been done; 
technology absorbs human attention; annihilation 
wars and dictatorships scar the face of humanity; 
the city becomes the mega-city, dissolving all 
emotional connections with the land and 
transforming the soil into nothing but economic 
value; the faith in Reason becomes progressively 
distraught as Reason fails to deliver the 
rational harmony and happiness that it foretells.  
In terms of personality types that embody the 
character of civilization, Spengler nominates 
Napoleon as a forerunner of the winter season. 
However, in looking to the most complete 
personifications of the season in his own time, 
(winter), Spengler found Bismarck (the conqueror 
and the welder of the nation) and the empire 
builder, Cecil Rhodes as worthy specimens (Frye 
1974: 3).In the phase of civilization mankind is 
driven down into a state of ‘vegetative’ 
servitude (Cervo 1990: 77). This is an 
appropriate condition, for, according to 
Spengler, in winter, civilization is literally 
rotting. 
 
A ‘Great Romantic Poem’? 
 
The endurance of Spengler’s study defies the 
reckoning made against it. Since the end of the 
second world war, most accounts in the history of 
ideas, have it as bound in the grave. Yet, 
repeatedly, it rises from the dead. It reclaims 
its privileged insight when some event – a 
massacre, a terrorist bombing, or some such - or 
more evasively, when a vague, but prolonged 
foreboding, presses down upon the media and 
public opinion. There are two levels upon which 
an approach to this issue should be conducted. 
Awkwardly, despite producing a theory of history 
that is generally seen to be conclusively 
falsified, quite a few of Spengler’s predictions 
came true. In addition, a good deal of his 
thought regarding developments in culture and 
civilization remains of interest. The most 
helpful way of considering if there is some sort 
of ‘posthumous’ vindication, is to examine 
Adorno’s two decisive assessments of The Decline 
of the West (Adorno 1966a; 1967a).  
             But before coming to this, it is 
necessary to tackle the first level by giving due 
to Spengler’s extraordinary way with words. 
Earlier, I used the word ‘lapidary’ to describe 
his prose style. The adverb ‘mostly’ was used to 
qualify this. Many passages and sections in the 
study are wonderfully expressed. Not without 
justice, Northrop Frye called the book ‘one of 
the world’s great romantic poems’ (Frye 1974: 6). 
Others have also commented upon the poetic power 
of the text (Mumford 1944: 375). For reasons of 
space, it is not possible here to provide 
anything more than a flavour of this. However, 
because it is a critical factor in explaining the 
longue duree of The Decline of the West, some 
indication of the power of Spengler’s language 
should be adduced, even en passant.  
It is in the image of the metropolis that 
Spengler finds the surest signs of Western 
civilization’s death warrant. The major cities of 
the West, he declares, are ‘daemonic stone-
deserts’ (Spengler 1928: 788). Their dwelling 
spaces have become atomized and estranged from 
Nature. People huddle in them with ‘nomadic’ 
thoughts, separated from the life outside, 
especially from contact with the land, and, more 
dangerously, from the inspiring ideals of Kultur. 
‘These final cities are wholly intellect’ 
declares Spengler (1928: 788 emphasis in 
original). In his view, this breeds ‘lamentable 
poverty’ and ‘degraded habits’ (Spengler 1928: 
790). The metropolis gives succor to moribund 
elites who live in the splendour of temps perdue. 
The remaining city dwellers are cast into the 
perdition of unrewarding labour. The wealthy 
retreat into their compounds and insulate 
themselves from history by feasting off the ‘best 
blood’ of the country (Spengler 1928: 790). He 
means by this that the elite use the majority of 
the population as anonymous providers of 
commodities and services. Spengler sees the 
metropolis as a barren plain of dehumanization.  
As we shall see presently, it is a metaphor that 
appealed to thinkers for whom, outwardly, there 
is no reason to claim a Spenglerian connection.  
Herbert Marcuse, in One Dimensional Man, guides 
the reader along the barren plain of capitalist 
dehumanization (Marcuse 1964).  It is a journey 
that perhaps reveals, the true depth of 
Spengler’s influence upon young German 
intellectuals in the 1920s and 30s.  At 
civilization’s end, the giant cities are nothing 
but gigantic walled-compounds for the elite, 
skulking behind their concrete walls, ‘as men of 
the Stone Age, sheltered in caves and pile-
dwellings’ (Spengler 1928: 795).  
 
  This, then, is the conclusion of the 
  city’s history: growing from primitive  
  barter-centre to Culture-city and at 
  last to world-city, it sacrifices first 
  the blood and soul of its creators to   
  the needs of its majestic evolution, and 
  then the last flower of that growth to 
  the spirit of Civilization – and so, 
  doomed, moves on to final  
  self-destruction (Spengler 1928: 796). 
 
One can see why writing like this refuses to 
expire. Adorno was particularly struck with the 
cave man as an analogy of life in mass society 
(Adorno 1966a: 27; 1967a:56). The literary 
qualities of the study, surely go a long way to 
account for its longevity (Frye 1974).  
However, there is also the matter of vindication.  
Spengler got some things right. It is this that 
Adorno wrestles with most, and it is this that 
persuades him that it is a major error to adopt a 
‘supercilious’ attitude to Spengler (Adorno 
1966a: 25). Spengler’s insistence that Weimar 
Parliamentarianism is structurally impotent, and 
that its sterility must lead to the new 
Caesarism, has already been noted. In mitigation, 
Adorno (1966a: 26) first, makes the obvious point 
that Hitler and Mussolini were eventually 
defeated. By their deaths, and the collapse of 
their jackboot regimes, Western parliamentary 
democracy reinvented itself. In Western Europe 
their passing was replaced by a long economic 
boom which, which, when Adorno was writing, was 
still in full throttle. The formation of the 
European Community may also be cited as an 
historical reaction to Caesarism. It was partly 
designed to ensure that war in Europe could never 
happen again (Judt 2004; Anderson 2009). Adorno 
takes all of this as hard evidence that 
Spengler’s prediction of the ‘new Caesarism’ was 
based on a faulty premise, namely, that the 
decline of the West is irreversible.  
Yet in our own day, the revival of nationalism in 
Europe, in the shape of the Brexit vote in the UK 
(2016); Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom 
movement in the Netherlands; Marine Le Pen and 
the Front National in France;  Nikolas 
Michaloiakos and the Golden Dawn Party in Greece 
and the AfD (Alternative for Germany); Vladimir 
Putin in Russia and, of course, the surprise 
Presidential election of Donald Trump in the USA 
(2016), hardly leave one sanguine that Spengler’s 
comments about the defects of Parliamentary 
democracy and their tendency to spawn ‘Caesars’ 
have lost relevance. The West may not be facing a 
new Hitler or a new Mussolini, but Caeserist 
tendencies have again, all too uncomfortably, 
become part of the current political terrain.   
            Another of Spengler’s propositions 
that Adorno believed has been corroborated is 
that the exhaustion of high culture breeds an 
ethos of abstraction and indifference in the 
intelligentsia (Adorno 1966a: 28). In typical 
Frankfurt School fashion he maintained that 
social criticism has been replaced by ideas and 
arguments in philosophy, economics and political 
science whose purpose is to reproduce the 
dominant power structure. This blocks the  
meaningful empowerment of lower strata to achieve 
mobility or significant redistributions of 
economic wealth. Spengler wrote in the midst of 
an intellectual culture in Germany in which 
Western assurance had been profoundly disturbed 
by the war.  But there were also new intellectual 
challenges to long-serving convictions about 
Western supremacy and immutability. Two cases in 
points were Saussure’s structural linguistics and 
the psychoanalytic movement led by Freud.  Both 
tendencies imply that myth and syllogism are at 
the heart of meaning. This led to the theoretical 
and methodological invocation that final, 
ultimate conclusions in human analysis must be 
avoided. One result of this was to redefine truth 
as a process-based entity i.e. an entity that is 
perpetually conceiving.  Emphatically, this was 
not Spengler’s position. He regarded the traction 
of morphology in civilization to be remorseless. 
The scruples of structural linguistics and 
psychoanalysis would have meant nothing to him. 
They were the embodiment of abstract Rationalism, 
which he despised. For Spengler, Rationalism 
finally begets arid positivism. Positivism 
fillets the world, and subjects its compound 
components to disambiguated interrogation. It 
takes it as a procedural rule that only that 
which is manifest in experience is trustworthy.  
This is the opposite of the physiognomic approach 
which relies so much on the rule of ‘inner 
certainty’ and the workings of the soul.  
 
Conclusion: A Matter of Neglected Profoundity? 
 
Despite Adorno’s admonition to dissent from 
drawing a ‘supercilious’ judgement on Spengler, 
he finally rejects the thesis. He cannot stomach 
Spengler’s crepuscular logic that history is a 
‘thoughtless mechanical process’, set to a 
‘monstrous rhythm’, that precludes the 
opportunity for mankind to learn to ‘determine 
itself’ (Adorno 1966a: 29). Despite this,  
Spengler continues to nip.  
In the welter of comments that has accumulated to 
explain why this might be so, perhaps one remark, 
attributed to the great Dutch cultural historian, 
Johan Huizinga, rings most true. Whole chunks of 
Spengler’s thesis, he maintains, are frequently 
‘absurd’; he ‘bewitches’ readers by compelling 
them ‘to forget that we know better’ (Dret 1980: 
100). There is indeed, a type of Western 
forgetfulness invoked at this point, with which 
Adorno was, beyond doubt, heavily preoccupied. We 
will come to the issue presently, but it is not 
the main subject of Huizinga’s train of thought. 
For him, Spengler’s fatalism portrays history as 
an unbroken chain of predestined causes. Once the 
thesis built-up a head of steam, ‘the decline of 
the West’ rapidly transfixed into an immutable 
law that comfortably assimilates the most 
flagrant incoherence and wildest contradictions. 
Everything can be boiled down, and reduced, to 
its premise. For Huizinga, this is bad history 
because it pre-judges observation and melts 
contrary shards of evidence into its own coinage. 
Those who reflect seriously upon the West, are 
required to think in terms of a morphology as a 
cycle of birth, life and death that cannot be 
moderated or overthrown. In contrast, Huizinga 
was a thinker of what we would now call, ‘the 
middle range’ (Merton 1968). In other words, he 
advocated that empirical research should be the 
basis for the formulation, and measurable 
testing, of general statements of theory. This is 
the antithesis of Spengler’s absolutist, 
universal, law-like approach which saw itself as 
explaining the entire life of civilization. 
The notoriety of Spengler’s thesis derives 
precisely from revealing the grand, and fateful, 
illusion of the Enlightenment that Reason is 
unidirectional and inherently positive. 
Spengler’s intense skepticism about this was very 
much congenial to Adorno (Adorno and Horkheimer 
1979; Adorno 1966b). For him, famously, the 
holocaust flatly put paid to the Enlightenment 
twinning of Reason with Progress. Instead of 
venerating history as a unilinear, universal 
process, Adorno insisted that it is, like all 
that is human, uneven and dialectical. Here, 
Adorno stuck to his guns at a moment when some of 
his Frankfurt epigones took a distinctly 
Spenglerian turn. For example, in the 60’s 
Herbert Marcuse concluded his highly influential 
critique of the West with a quote from Walter 
Benjamin, (an author who, incidentally, has more 
claim than most to be classed as a victim of the 
decline of the West): 
 
 It is only for the sake of those without  
 hope that hope is given to us (Marcuse 
 1964: 200). 
 
Given the profound pessimism of the preceding 
pages in his study, Marcuse’s choice of 
Benjamin’s words as an epitaph reads like a lame 
non sequitor. Prima facie, One Dimensional Man is 
strewn with literary formulations, such as ‘the 
totally administered society’, ‘the society 
without opposition’, ‘the end of technological 
rationality’, ‘the happy consciousness’ (the 
belief that the real is rational and that the 
system delivers the goods), which appear to 
vindicate Spengler’s thesis.  After all, what 
does a ‘society without opposition’ possibly 
mean, if not an entity in which dialectics has 
nothing to do with human choice?  Further, what 
can ‘one dimensional society’ mean, if not the 
absence of other dimensions, other stimulants for 
change? At bottom, what is this, if not, some 
kind of ‘morphology’ bent upon demonstrating 
unilateral, self-confirming, implacable 
dehumanization of life under capitalism?  This is 
not to imply that Marcuse was actually a closet 
devotee of Spengler. If anything, the point plays 
into Adorno’s hand. It implies that criticism of 
the West can, in certain circumstances, swiftly 
descend into primitive determinism i.e. an 
outlook that precludes the opportunity for 
mankind to ‘determine itself’. Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics condemns the Enlightenment for 
heralding ‘progress without dialectics’ (Adorno 
1966b). In this sense, he believed that the 
holocaust was not an aberration from the 
Enlightenment, but a logical outcome of its 
trajectory. For his part, had he lived, 
doubtless, Spengler would have recognized the 
holocaust as further incontrovertible proof of 
the imminent demise of zivilization.  
Perhaps in subconscious homage to the ‘cave man’ 
idiom in Spengler, Adorno invites us to see 
modern men and women bearing the imprint of 
‘traces of the stone age’, unable to accept ‘the 
horror teeming under the stone of culture’ 
(Adorno 1967b: 260). However, for him, the clock 
is not set. Resistance and opposition are  
meaningful. This does not come without crucial 
qualifications. Like David Hume, (1804), Adorno 
believes that it is perfectly acceptable to view 
Reason as the servant of the Passions. In modern 
times, the holocaust is perhaps the greatest, 
hurtful proof of this (Bauman 1989). Of course, 
to dismiss the supremacy of Reason is very 
different from abandoning the idea that Reason is 
indispensable. In riposte to Spengler’s rigid 
absolutism, Adorno propounds the more generous 
hypothesis that, ‘if there is any chance of 
changing the situation, it is only through 
undiminished insight’ (Adorno 1991: 173). 
Incidentally, this is also, the main reason for 
the longevity of Spengler’s thesis i.e. its 
vampiric after-life. For the cold logic of 
Negative Dialectics is that there is no such 
thing as ‘undiminished insight’. Every matter 
outwardly settled by Reason, will, in time, 
elicit unintended consequences. In the West when 
this occurs, Spengler is rediscovered anew, and 
apologetically proffered as a neglected, byegone 
contribution of forgotten profundity. Here is the 
real reason why Spengler continued to haunt 
Adorno. Spengler’s ectoplasm manifests whenever 
any vicissitude, or cumulative downward 
propulsion, in the development of the West 
occurs. The task before us then is, not to 
squander any more time upon the quandary of 
deciding if Spengler was ultimately right or 
wrong. Adorno settled that issue in the negative 
long ago (Adorno 1966a; 1966b). If it may be 
concluded, by putting it like this: the question 
we face with Spengler is to elucidate what 
particular economic, social and psychological 
conditions make his version of fatalism endure?  
After all, there is more than enough evidence to 
dismiss the thesis of inescapable, downward 
propulsion in the West as tommyrot (Pinker 2011). 
Yet it must be observed, even when the contrary 
evidence conclusively abounds, how readily the 
West falls into the path of grim-visaged 
fatalism. There is no light at the end of the 
tunnel; everything is slowly, but surely, getting 
worse.  In the last hundred years, Spengler was 
the doyen of this position. Finally however, it 
is perhaps most accurate to see him as a symptom, 
rather than the cause, of a peculiarly, deathless 
Occidental mentalite.   
 
References 
 
1. John Maynard Keynes rebuked the Treaty as ‘a 
Carthaginian Peace’ (Unterberger 1986). By 
this he meant that the terms of Versailles 
mirrored the peace brokered by the Romans 
after the defeat of Carthage. In both cases, 
argued Keynes, the terms were so brutal and 
humiliating that they laid the ground for a 
negative reaction. 
 
2. The term the longue duree (long duration) is 
foundational to the Annales School, of which 
Braudel was the dominant member. The Annales 
used the term to define a genuinely 
historical approach to issues, compared with 
the event-based episodic approach to time  
that characterizes popular journalism and 
the mainstream media.   
 
3.  For another article perhaps, it would be 
interesting to compare Herder’s absolutist, 
universal theory with Bauman’s theory of 
liquid modernity.  The latter emphasizes the 
omnipresence of mobility.   
 
4.  As a Weimar legal theorist and, in time 
‘Crown Jurist’ Schmitt was an enthusiastic 
participant in the attempt to justify Nazi 
rule.  He was an ardent anti-semite (Mehring 
2014).  He defended Hitler’s extra-judicial 
killing’s  of political opponents and the 
‘cleansing’ of German jurisprudence of 
Jewish influence (Gross 2007).   
 
5. Here, Hitler and the Nazi’s clearly echo  
Spengler in claiming that it is the desting 
of the Third Reich to last ‘a thousand 
years’. 
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